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ABSTRACT
ROBERT RUSSELL LYNCH II: The Hartz Commission vs. the Alliance for Jobs: A Study
in German Labor Market Reform
The political system ofGermany is oftentimes characterized by incremental
developments which shy away from major, controversial reform. This is especially
true for economic reforms centered around the German labor market. However,
despite this incremental system a series ofcontroversial and comprehensive
reforms ofthe German labor market, collectively known as the Hartz reforms, were
successfully implemented in 2004. This is especially peculiar when the failed
Alliance for Jobs, an attempt at similar reforms in the late 1990’s to early 2000’s,is
taken into consideration.
This thesis will explore how the Hartz reforms were passed in this
incremental system by comparing its success with the rather typical failure ofthe
Alliance for Jobs reforms. In order to accomplish this goal, this thesis will rely
heavily on texts concerning the German policymaking process and its resistance
toward major economic reform in order to establish a frame of reference. Once a
basic understanding ofthe policymaking process is obtained, this work will then
chiefly utilize political science journals and periodicals to specify the nature ofthe
policies, the people and groups involved in their respective processes, and their
respective outcomes.
As we will see, the Hartz reforms succeeded where the Alliance for Jobs
reforms failed. The heavy influence oflabor interests, cabinet ministries, and
opposition within the German Chancellor’s own party on the nature ofthe Alliance
reforms made any semblance ofconsensus impossible. By avoiding these obstacles
through efficient, commission-derived policies and well timed implementation, the
IV

Hartz reforms were able to come to fruition in a system which would normally
never allow for legislation of their nature to pass.
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Introduction

Despite the increasing sense ofEuropean unity resulting from multi
nationalism and economic cooperation, one manifestation of which is the European
Union, competition among European states as to which country stands out as the
“frontrunner” continues to play an important role in both foreign and domestic
European politics. European nations, vying for competitive advantages and unique
market shares, appear to be more interested in their respective national economies
than in of any sort of multi-national union. While this competition spans the
continent, one nation possesses a unique drive to become and maintain status as the
chief economic power within Europe: Germany.
This “status quo” ofsorts concerning Germany as the main economic power
in Europe does, ofcourse, have some historical significance and reasoning. German
industrialism and ingenuity has been at the forefront ofthe European economy
since the end of post-war German occupation. The Wirtschaftswunder(“economic
miracle”) ofthe 1950’s characterizes the rapid reconstruction and development of
the West German economy during this time period. The Marshall Plan and currency
reform, which established a stable, legal tender in the Deutsche Mark,brought about
in a lasting period oflow inflation and rapid industrial growth. This period of
6

economic growth elevated West Germany from nearly complete post-war
ruin to a leader among the developed nations in modern Europe. Furthermore,the
foundation of multi-national economic communities such as the European Coal and
Steel Community and the European Common Market allowed Germany's economic
growth to exist in sharp contrast to the struggling conditions ofother post-war
European nations, namely Great Britain.^ These favorable conditions lasted well
into the 1960’s when,just before the onset ofrecession, industrial production was
increasing at a rate of8%, wages and salaries were increasing by 8.5%, and inflation
and unemployment rates were so low that they were essentially negligible.
As of2007,Germany stands as one ofthe world’s premier industrial and
service economies possessing a labor force of nearly 45 million people. Inflation
levels are lower than 2% and the overall Gross Domestic Product(GDP)of$2.5
trillion currently ranks 5^*^ in the world when Purchasing Power Parity(PPP)is
taken into account.^ Germany has been long characterized by its incredible trade
surplus, the highest in Europe."^ The only truly alarming economic statistics center
around Germany’s unemployment rate and GDP per capita. While as of2007 the
unemployment rate is declining, it still stands out as one ofthe highest in Western
Europe at nearly 7%,and 13 European nations rank higher than Germany in GDP
Henderson, David R."German Economic "Miracle"" The Concise Library ofEconomics. The Library of
Economics and Liberty. <http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/GermanEconomicMiracle.html>.
^ Orlow, Dietrich. A History of Modem Germany. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002. p
277.
^ "Germany: the Human Development Index, Going Beyond Income." Human Development Reports.
United Nations Development Programme.
<http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_DEU.html>.
4 M
German Trade Surplus Hits Record." BBC News. 8 Dec. 2006. British Broadcasting Company. 1 Dec.
2007 <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/business/6161715.stm>.
7

per capita.^
The role ofGermany as the prime location for economic investment and
activity, known in German political discourse as Standort Deutschland (literally
translates as “location Germany”), has presented much discussion and debate ever
since the rise of globalization and the fall ofthe Berlin Wall. While once standing
out as a leader in research, development, and manufacturing primarily due to its
specialization in high-quality, high-tech goods, Germany has recently seen its role as
Europe’s economic leader dwindle. This is mainly a result ofother international
players, most notably Japan and other industrialized Asian nations,increasing their
level manufactured goods dependent on highly-skilled and heavily-trained labor,
thus infiltrating a global niche that Germany once dominated. This is not to suggest
that Germany is no longer economically potent, but there is significant cause for
concern, which has prompted a need for reform.^ The forces that have affected
Germany’s economy, both internally and externally, have led to decreasing foreign
investment, lagging high-technology inventiveness, and increasing structural
unemployment. The demand for change, the high cost oflabor, and the monetary
burden ofthe German welfare state have led to numerous economic initiatives in
both the public and private sectors.^
One area ofeconomic concern that has become the most pressing issue in
^ "Rank Order - GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)." CIA World Factbook. Dec. 2007. Central Intelligence
Agency. 1 Dec. 2007 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>.
^ Pfanner, Eric. "As Economies Slow, Europe Finds Reforms Easier to Take." The International Her^d
Tribune 23 Jime 2007, sec. NEWS: 1..
^ Dyson, Kenneth. “The Economic Order” in Developments in German Politics 2. Gordon Smith, William
E. Patterson, and Stephen Padgett, eds. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1996. 206-208.
8

contemporary German economics-related politics is that ofthe German labor
market. Labor politics have always played a significant role in the political
atmosphere of any industrialized nation due to the influence that the condition of
the labor market can have on potential voters and Germany has been no exception.
With unemployment rates growing steadily since reunification and peaking in 1997
and 2003 at levels which were, at the time, unmatched by any other Western
European nation,^ the market for labor has recently played a more significant role in
German policymaking.
The historic precedents of modern German labor reforms are numerous.
Notably, the early 1990’s marked significant unrest among legislators and labor
interests as labor from the former German Democratic Republic (colloquially “East
Germany”) and glaringly lower standards oflabor and living became evident
between the two Germanys. Efforts were made towards wage increases with the
goal of a higher living standard in the East that many Eastern Germans felt were
promised to them by Helmut Kohl’s administration. This unrest has been noted as a
contributing factor towards placing Germany into one ofits worst post-war
recessions in the mid 1990’s.^ The shaky balance between the economic
performance ofGermany and the condition ofits labor market is evidenced by these
economic downturns.
These elements of recent German history—economic ingenuity,incredible

® "German Unemployment Hits New High." CNN.Com.5 Feb. 2003. CNN,Reuters.
<http://www.cnn.eom/2003/BUSINESS/02/05/german.jobs/>.
^ Orlow. A History of Modem Germany. 344-345.
9

economic turnaround, and the role oflabor politics—have led to recent
legislation that seeks to change the overall economic climate ofGermany. This
legislation, known as “Agenda 2010,” is a group ofreforms which were initially
drawn up in 2003 by the administration ofGerhard Schroder with the goal of
modernizing the German labor market as well as the social systems which deal with
the labor market. Essentially,Agenda 2010 is a system designed to reduce
Germany’s unemployment by promoting economic growth. The Agenda’s largest
reforms, known as the “Hartz” reforms, were seen as incredibly controversial and
therefore nearly impossible to design and implement in the modem German
policymaking system. The reforms were drawn up by a committee representing a
wide array ofinterests known as the “Hartz Commission” and represented a major
shift in the labor market policy ofthe German welfare state.
The reforms were divided into four major parts, aptly titled Hartz I-IV. Hartz
I and II were geared towards restructuring the German Job Agencies and other labor
related bureaucracies to promote more active job searches and conduct business
more efficiently. Hartz HI was geared towards rebuilding the Federal Labor
Institution which,in 2002, was discovered to have falsified a significant number of
German labor statistics in order to cover up its inadequacies as ajob placement
agency. The greatest controversy with the Hartz Reforms came with the fourth and
final element of reform. Hartz IV was centered on changing the structure offederal
unemployment benefits. To promote more active job searches, argued its
supporters, Hartz IV would both reduce the amount of money one could receive as
10

unemployment benefits and reduce the amount oftime in which the benefits
10

could be collected.

In a nation that prides itselfon being a welfare state,this

reduction in government benefits was very controversial.
When the Hartz Commission first met in early 2003,the state ofGermany’s
economy looked grim. German unemployment levels reached new highs, putting
Chancellor Schroder’s Social Democratic Party at risk against the opposing Christian
Democratic Union in the upcoming federal elections. Furthermore, the Federal
Labor Office blamed the rising unemployment on already difficult labor market
conditions coupled with regulations under German employment protection laws.
Along with those employment conditions, European economists estimated a
11

continually weak labor market in Germany until the 2004 fiscal year,

The rising

unemployment rate, reaching a staggering 10%,accompanied the latest round of
German labor reforms.

The measures proposed by Schroder and his Agenda 2010, especially when
the tax cuts are considered, bear likeness to American Reaganomics and British
Thatcherism,conservative economic reforms that provided a strong economic boost
12

in their respective countries in the 1980’s.

The nature ofthese reforms,coupled

with the timeliness oftheir conception,led to a great deal ofcontroversy, both in the
10

Green, Simon, Dan Hough, Alister Miskimmon, and Graham Timmins, eds. “The Reform of the Welfare
State.” The Politics of New Germany. London: Routledge, 2007. 126-140, here 137 ; Dyson, Kenneth.
“Binding Hands as a Strategy for Economic Reform: Government by Commission.” German Politics
(2005) Volume 14: Nr 2. 225-247, here p. 236
11 II
German Unemployment Hits New High." CNN.Com.5 Feb. 2003. CNN.
<http://62.233.169.104/2003/BUSINESS/Germany/imemployment0feb03.htm>.
Findley, Carter V., and John Alexander M.Rothney. Twentieth Century World. 5th ed. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company,2002. 297-302.
11

the German political landscape and in Europe as a whole.
This controversy was immediately apparent. On the very same day that
Scrhdder announced his plans before the Bundestag, a number of politicians
immediately criticized Agenda 2010 from a variety of angles. Then-opposition
leader and future Chancellor Angela Merkel became a leading voice against the
reforms, arguing that they did not go far enough to really help the German economy.
The Free Democratic Party leaders expressed concerns that the reforms were likely
to set Germany back as opposed to actually resulting in progress. Criticism from
trade union leaders accused Schroder of attempting to bring down the German
welfare state under the pressure from opposition parties, and socialist leaders
«13

labeled Chancellor Schroder as “socially unbalanced.

Despite this initial controversy, the reforms ofAgenda 2010 slowly gained
acceptance among opposing politicians, both within the opposition parties and
Schroder’s own SPD,and the general German public. The increasing popularity of
the reforms can be chiefly attributed to a realization by German workers and
politicians alike that reform was necessary for Germany to remain internationally
competitive. This increasing acceptance ofthe policy came in the wake offurther
14

increasing unemployment, especially in the formerly communist eastern Germany.

“German opposition, trade unions criticize Schroeder's economic proposals.” BBC Monitoring Europe —
Political. Transcription of Deutschlandfunk radio, Cologne. 15 Mar. 2003.
14

Schroder's Reforms and Staying Power." Business & Finance Magazine. 7 Oct. 2004.
12

In the summer of2007 it appeared that the desired effects of the
Agenda 2010 legislation were being realized as unemployment rates decreased to a
rate not seen since 2001. The improvement ofthe labor market is estimated to have
positive economic effects that could last until 2010.^^ Although the Agenda 2010
reforms have been successful despite the controversy they generated (especially
over the Hartz commission reforms), debate continues over the effect this
legislation will have on the German economy in the long run and, perhaps more
significantly, on the system ofGerman polic3miaking.

The controversy and questions arising as a result ofthe passage ofthe
legislation drafted by the Hartz commission only serve to demonstrate just how
unusual these reforms were. Not only were they wide in the scope oftheir effect,
but they were radical in their nature. Radical reforms such as Agenda 2010 require
a great deal of political deliberation,compromise and coalition building, which
many would have thought nearly impossible to achieve in the German political
system. In many ways,the success ofthe Hartz reforms was a surprise. As recently
as 1998 another initiative to reform Germany’s ailing labor market, the Alliance for
Jobs, had failed miserably. The Alliance for Jobs,Training, and Competitiveness was
an attempt to address German economic woes through legislation based on
cooperation oflabor, government, and business interests. In early 1998, shortly
after Schroder won the Chancellery, concerns over Germany’s competitiveness led
to the creation of a commission that would draft plans to repair the ailing labor
IS ●●

Plummeting Unemployment in Gennany." Business Week. 29 June 2007.
13

market. The Alliance brought together top union leaders,SPD party leaders
and major trade organizations under the direction ofChancellor Schroder in the
hope of reaching a consensus on reform. The Alliance lasted until 2003, but as early
as 2000, it became clear that the Alliance had failed. In short. The Alliance for Jobs
could not overcome the obstacles represented by the German policymaking process
in the area of major socioeconomic reforms. How could Agenda 2010, most notably
Hartz IV, become legislation in Germany? Could the pressing needs for change have
driven the passage ofthe reforms or were certain elements ofthe German
policymaking system circumvented?
By exploring the political process in Germany, my thesis will attempt to
provide an explanation ofthe unlikely success ofthe Agenda 2010 labor market. My
objective is to determine what could have allowed for their passage. This will be
accomplished through a comparative analysis ofthe Hartz Commission and the
Alliance for Jobs. Using an analysis ofthe German policymaking system, we will see
that the failure ofthe Alliance for jobs is very typical ofa German policymaking
system characterized by centrist policies and incremental change. The Hartz
Commission,on the other hand, used similar methods to pursue nearly identical
ends but was a success. How could Chancellor Schroder,Peter Hartz, and the
modernizing wing ofthe SPD attempt to enact economic reforms through
corporatist and commission-derived legislation twice in the span ofonly a few years
and see great success with one attempt and miserable failure with another? By
comparing the two cases and an analyzing the elements ofthe German system, we
14

will hopefully be able to ascertain why the Alliance failed and the Hartz
Reforms succeeded.

15

The Difficulties of Economic Reform within German Policymaking

In the face of the many issues surrounding globalization, questions
surrounding the adequacy ofthe German system of economic reform began to
surface. Many theorized that Germany was,through its policymaking process,
unable to fully enact the fast-acting and expansive plans to combat concerns with
rising unemployment and inflation unless “old-school populism” transformed itself
»16

into “broad acceptance ofthe necessity for far-reaching economic reforms,

This

means that reforms such as those attempted by the Alliance for Jobs and enacted by
the Hartz Commission are generally unpopular and difficult to implement.
In order to better understand why Schroder, the reformist wing ofthe SPD,
and Peter Hartz would form seemingly unpopular and improbable policies through
the unconventional medium of“government by commission,” one must first analyze
the German policymaking process. Furthermore, an understanding ofthe politics
surrounding the various vetoing powers inherent to the German system can
sufficiently explain the recent moves towards commission derived policies as well
as the makeup ofthe commissions themselves. In order to achieve such an end, this
chapter will first provide a brief overview ofthe political basics ofthe policymaking

Benoit, Bertrand."An Altered Zeitgeist Germany is in Retreat From Economic Reform." Financial Times
11 Oct. 2007.
16

processes within the Federal Republic. This chapter will explore the elements
ofGerman policymaking—namely corporatism,the major political parties, and the
makeup ofGerman federalism—which serve the greatest role in hindering large
scale economic reform,in order to provide reasonable grounds to delve into the
concepts of“semisovereignty” and “government by commission.
In order to answer the question as to why this type ofreform is so difficult.
analysis of the “semisovereign” nature of the German system along with the
numerous 44veto players” is necessary. A veto player,in this sense, can be described
as 44an individual or collective actor whose agreement...is required for a change in
«17

policy.

Perhaps no scholar has done more to analyze and explain this element of

German politics than Peter J. Katzenstein. His principal work on the topic. Policy
and Politics in West Germany: the Growth of a Semisovereign State, has sparked
much debate on the topic. Given how influential Katzenstein and his work have
been to this field, this chapter will rely heavily on his works and works by numerous
other scholars which serve as an “addendum” or “follow-up” to Katzenstein’s
writing. Using Katzenstein as a guideline, this chapter will focus chiefly on the
German institutions that, as he describes it, link “state and society as well as
different levels ofgovernment” therefore encompassing “political opponents in a
9>18

tight policy network.

17

Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1995.
302. As cited in: Katzenstein, Peter J. Policy and Politics in West Germany: the Growth of a Semisoverien
State. Philadelpiha, PA: Temple UP, 1987. 35.
18
Katzenstein. Policy and Politics in West Germany. 35.
17

A Decentralized State
The modern German federal state is characterized by a high level ofstate
decentralization. Furthermore, this decentralized state is coupled with a highly
centralized society with a concentration of power in large social groups. While
allowing for a stable and liberal democracy,the weakened federal institutions can
be politically hindered not only by each other, but also by the numerous private
interest holders who hold a great deal ofinfluence in German politics. This element
ofGerman politics, its so-called “semisovereignty,” can make change on a great scale
19

very difficult and therefore favors rather incremental developments.
In this case we have particular interest in the Federal Chancellor
{Bundeskanzler/iri) and the restrictions placed on him or her to pass legislation that
he or she may be championing. On the one hand. The German Chancellor plays a
20

very influential role comparable to that ofthe Prime Minister ofGreat Britain,

This

is because the brunt ofpolitical power in the German executive branch comes from
the Chancellor and his or her ability to direct policy guidelines and choose his or her
cabinet ministers. Additionally, the Federal Chancellor plays an important role
within his or her respective political party and shaping policies thereof. This can be
seen in the fact that only one Federal German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was not
the chairman of his own party. Furthermore, the German Chancellor is difficult to

19

Katzenstein. Policy and Politics in West Germany 11-15.
James, Peter. "Government and the Political Parties." Modem Germany: Politics. Society and Culture.
Ed. Peter James. London: Routledge, 1998. 45-67, here 47.
18
20

21

remove from office once he or she has been elected.

A lost vote in

confidence could usher in new elections, but the only truly viable option for
removing a Chancellor within the German federal system is the “constructive vote of
no confidence” {konstruktives Misstrauensvotum), which requires the vote of no
confidence to be supplemented with alternative candidate agreed upon by the
federal parliament. This vote has only occurred twice in the history offederal
Germany and has only succeeded once with Helmut Kohl’s replacement ofHelmut
22

Schmidt as federal Chancellor in 1982.

On the other hand, despite the great level of power placed within the
Chancellery, the position has many restraints which act to limit the degree to which
he or she can enact real reform. For example,the federal ministries, while
appointed and guided by the Chancellor, are more independent than in most cabinet
systems. This is chiefly due to the constitutional right to the autonomy ofthe
ministers to operate their own departments (Ressortprinzip)P As long as the
actions of a given minister and his/her stafffit within the political guidelines set
forth by the Chancellor,their work is free from interference. Furthermore, the
political party structure and system ofcoalition governance
explored later in this section

which will both be

provide the coalition partner or partners with ample

opportunity for representation on the federal cabinet. In this sense,federal
ministries can act as either extensions ofor opposition to the Chancellor and his or
21

Katzenstein. Policy and Politics in West Germany. 22.
Green, Simon, Dan Hough, Alister Miskimmon, and Graham Timmins, eds."A Blockaded System of
Goyemment?" The Politics of New Germany. London: Routledge, 2007. 57-76, here 58-9.
23
Green, et al. “A Blockaded System of Goyemment.” 59.
19
22

24

her policies.

With the reforms and attempted reforms discussed in this

work, we will see that the role of various federal ministries as a veto point is quite a
powerful one, especially when dealing with labor market reform. In these
situations, the Ministy ofFinance and the Ministry ofLabor and Social Affairs have a
great deal ofinfluence over the Chancellor and his or her policies.
Another decentralized element ofGerman politics lies in the practice ofthe
formation ofcoalition governments. That is, there has never been a period oftime
in Germany where a single political party was dominant over all other parties.
Instead ofsingle party dominance through “majority rule,” the German system of
plurality usually requires one ofthe two large “catch-all” parties to form a
governing coalition with a smaller, less-centrist party in order to assure that a
representative majority in Parliament can be obtained. This is due to an electoral
system characterized by proportional representation. In parliaments which use
electoral systems of proportional representation, parties earn a percentage ofseats
within governing bodies determined by the percentage ofvotes received in a given
election. This naturally leads to a higher number of different parties, none of which
represent an absolute majority of politicians or voters, due to the fact that there is
no system of“absolute majority, winner-takes-all” in place. Therefore, great
importance is placed on political coalition building among parties in the German
federal system. This means that, although parties may be organized independently,
the influence oftheir coalition partner(s) has a great impact upon their formation of

24

Katzenstein. Policy and Politics in West Germany. 23.

20
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policies.

While there are dozens of parties representing a myriad ofinterests,
ideologies, and classes, there have been two principal parties throughout the life of
the Federal Republic. These parties, the CDU-CSU(Christlich Demokratische Union
Deutschlands-Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern or Christian Democratic UnionChristian Social Union) and the SPD (Sozialdemohratische Partei Deutschlands or
Social-democratic Party ofGermany), are characterized by moderation, pragmatism,
and minimal differences. This broad appeal utilized by both parties has made it
difficult for the longstanding success of more ideologically driven political parties to
26

prosper to a similar extent.

This is evidenced in the description ofthe major

German parties as Volksparteien (“parties ofthe people”), or catch-all parties which
remain centrist while ebbing and flowing only with the general mood ofthe German
populace.
While the CDU-CSU and the SPD are the traditional “giants” ofthe German
system of political parties, many smaller parties currently exist or have existed as
coalition builders and champions ofspecific issue. The only significantly
longstanding third party, meaning that it saw its beginnings with the end ofAllied
occupational control,is the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei or Free Democratic
Party), which was consistently used by both the CDU-CSU and SPD in order to form
the necessary political coalitions ofGerman policymaking until 1998. Furthermore,

25

Green, et al. "A Blockaded System of Government?” 62.
Smith, Gordon."The Party System At the Crossroads,” Developments in German Politics 2. Ed. Gordon
Smith , William E. Paterson, and Stephen Padgett. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1996. 55-56.
21
26

during the Agenda 2010 reforms with which this work is generally concerned.
the Left/PDS (Linke/Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus or Left/Democratic
Socialist Party) and Alliance '90/The Greens {Bundnis ‘90/Die Griinen) held seats
within the Bundestag.
In the time period ofconcern with this work,Germany was governed by a
coalition of the SPD and the Greens with Gerhard Schroder ofthe SPD as Chancellor.
With respect to labor market reform, the Green party would do little to hinder
Schroder’s goals but, along those same lines, would help much either. This is due
mainly to the fact that the Green party rarely,if ever plays a role in economic issues,
27

especially those concerning labor.

Corporatism

Generally,corporatism is a term that classifies a political and/or economic
system characterized by a distribution of various powers amongst numerous civic
assemblies. These assemblies,known as “corporations”(a term which does not
necessarily mean the corporate business model), represent economic,industrial,
agrarian, social, cultural, and professional groups. These bodies, both unelected and
hierarchical, exert control over the social and economic elements oftheir respective
specialties. Germany is said to have a corporatist system in that a great deal ofthe
political and economic power it wields lies within the hands ofthese various

27

Dyson, Kenneth. “Binding Hands as a Strategy for Economic Reform.” 233.
22

corporations.^^ Seeing its roots in the relatively late arrival ofGerman
industrialization and nationalization,German corporatism is centered on collective
bargaining and political lobbying among the various peak associations of employer
and labor interests.^^ The basis ofcorporatism is a system of“interest
intermediation” linking the interests of producers (this can mean both labor and
employer interests) and the state through incorporating the various interest
organizations into the policy-making process. This has led to a great deal of power
being invested in banks,labor unions, and trade federations. These different
organizations hold positions on corporate boards, have large and well organized
hierarchical structures, and even play a significant role in the formation of political
policies.
This corporatist system is so ingrained into the German system that these
organizations, without question, always play important roles in economic reform.
This is especially true in regard to the labor market. In these areas, it is general
practice to bring together members ofthese various groups with politicians in order
to hammer out legislation that satisfies and serves to generally benefit all ofthe
parties involved. In this respect, the various corporatist players act in veto players
as that they are capable ofstalling, changing,or even ending potential reforms.
With concerns to the Agenda 2010 reforms, namely the reforms ofthe Hartz
Commission, the corporatist role ofIGMetall cannot be overlooked. As a labor
28

Katzenstein. Policy and Politics in West Genrany. 3.
Dyson, Kenneth. “The Economic Order.” 199.; Katzenstein. Policy and Politics in West Germany.
23
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union representing the workers who produce machine tools, automobiles,
and steel, it possesses influence over the most crucial sectors ofthe German
economy. The numerous sectors and occupations represented by IGMetall have put
it into a position where it, to a very high degree,forms the collective mindset ofthe
German working class. Furthermore,it is a leader in the process ofcollective
bargaining and is able to set the benchmarks for other unions to follow suit,
presenting a united front oflabor interests within the corporatist system. Simply
put,IGMetall is the role model for labor unions in the German corporatist system
30

and thus wields an extreme level ofinfluence.

As with many elements ofthe various policymaking methods throughout
Europe, globalization provides a new set ofchallenges and changes for the
corporatist system. The recent increasing concerns over competitiveness have led
to newer domestic policies of deregulation geared towards opening up market and
employment opportunities. This agenda, while seemingly modern in its concern
over Standort Deutschland, is caught in the incrementalism brought forth via
31

corporatist interests to block such reform,

As we will see with both the Hartz

reforms and the attempted Alliance reforms,IGMetall and other corporatist entities
have considerable power within the German political system.

German Federalism
30

Schmidt, Ingo."Monthy Review September 2005 Ingo Smidt
|
Germany's Corporatist Labor
Movement.". The Monthly Review. Sept. 2005<http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905schrmdt.htm>.
31

Dyson. “The Economic Order.” 203.
24

In order for policy guidelines, whether drawn up by the Chancellor,
federal ministries, or a group oflegislators, to become fully enacted into law a long
and detailed policymaking process must be followed. This process,like many other
in the world of developed, liberal democracies,lends its arduousness to the
involvement of multiple political players, each of which is equipped with methods
serving as checks and balances against the others. Since the overall topic ofthis
work is concerned with government bills as opposed to legal ordinances or
administrative regulations, the processes surrounding their passage, as opposed to
that of the others, will be focused on more carefully.
Germans describe their system offederalism as Politikverflechtung,or
(4

political interdependence.” This is because in the German system, differing
interests are brought together “through a policy process that resists central reform
>»32

initiatives and defies sustained attempts to steer policy objectives,

This is best

explained through the functional division of powers via allotting legal deliberation
to the federal level and implementation to the Lander(provincial) governments.
This has created an interlocking ofpolitical tiers played out in the upper house of
the German parliament or Bundesrat, which essentially exists as a federal forum for
Lander governments.

33

When compared to the American federal system, the

differing elements ofthe German system become quite clear. In the United States,
the powers of the federal government are independent from those ofthe individual

32

Katzenstein. Lewis J. West German Politics. New York: Columbia UP, 198645.
Saalfeld, Thomas. "Political Parties." Governance in Contemporary Germany: the Semisoverign State
Revisited. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP,2005. 46-77, here 46.
25

33

states. The German federal system, most clearly represented by the cabinet
ministries and the Bundestag^ is required to reach some sort ofconcordance with the
Bundesrat on the most important policy issues. The difficulties ofthe system of
political interdependence are further exacerbated when the issues ofstate
ministries’ administration offederal programs and the so-called “Joint Tasks”
involving sharing offinancing and implementation ofcertain legislation are
34

considered.

This system truly incorporates numerous levels ofgovernment, all of

which have significant power,in the creation oflegislation.
Formally,ideas for new policies originate from executive ministries.
35

parliament, or the Chancellor,

Most ofthese bills come from a coordinated effort

on behalf of the Chancellor and the various ministries. However,the Bundesrat, with
bills sponsored by the majority ofLander governments, and the Bundestag, with
written support of at least five percent ofthe chamber members,can write potential
policy as well. Legislation initiated by the executive branch or the Bundesrat is
discussed in draft form initially by a federal ministry. The Bundesrat then works
closely with the ministry to draft a bill suitable enough for the Bundestag.
Legislation which originates within the Bundestag is not subject to initial scrutiny by
36

the executive branch or the other house of parliament.
Next begins what is perhaps the most important process a bill can endure:
deliberation within the Bundestag. Here, much ofthe work is done in committees
34
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hoping to hammer out a compromise suitable for passage,

After an initial

reading, extensive committee deliberations lead to a version ofthe bill suitable for a
second reading. After this reading, debates along with a vote further test the
viability of a piece oflegislation. If necessary, a third reading will be held with a
final vote thereafter. The passage ofa bill within the Bundestag will then open it up
38

for deliberation within the Bundesrat.

While generally not as powerful as the Bundestag,the Bundesrat is still able to
serve important deliberative and policymaking functions. Once a bill reaches its
chamber it can either be approved and sent to the Chancellor, tagged with a
“suspensive veto”(which can be overridden by the Bundestag) or,in specific cases
where both houses ofthe German parliament cannot agree on a bill, be sent to a
conciliation committee {Vermittlungsausschuss) where members of both houses will
attempt to negotiate some form ofcompromise. If a bill can survive this arena, it is
then required to garner the signatures ofthe Chancellor, the minister over the policy
area of which the bill is concerned, and the federal president to be fully enacted into
law.

39

In this capacity, the Bundesrat performs as a vital link between the federal
government and the governments ofthe individual Bundesldnder. Each individual
Bundesland sends a certain number of delegates based on the population of their
respective Land. These representatives then nominate a chief“vote-caster,” forcing
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the Lander delegations to vote as a bloc. Since the delegations are based upon
the strength of the political parties on a state level and not nationally, the political
makeup of the Bundesrat can and often has differed greatly from that ofthe
40

Bundestag.
Through these various processes and characteristics, the Bundesrat plays a
vital role in the legislative process, especially with legislation that affects the
individual Bundesldnder more so than the federal government. This is chiefly due to
the federal reforms of2006 which,among many other things, defined an array ofsocalled “concurrent” legislation. Under this reform, anything defined as concurrent
legislation (chiefly economic regulations and labor market reform) requires an
41

absolute majority ofBundesrat votes for passage,

Although this is a crucial issue to

consider as of the completion of this work,the Alliance for Jobs and Hartz reforms
were not subject to these federal reforms as they were both undergoing the
policymaking process before 2006.
As a result ofthese differences between the federal and Lander levels of
government, especially with respect to party makeup,the Bundesrat has set itself
aside as the “most visible ‘veto point’ in German politics,

This is especially true

when each house ofthe German parliament has a different party in the majority.
This system of“cooperative federalism,” which was seemingly intended to form
consensus through problem solving, persuasion, bargaining or coercion is instead
40
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manifested through strategies ofconflict avoidance. In addition, this difficult
political environment has created a situation where, generally speaking,complex
policy issues are divided into smaller “decision segments.” These decision segments
certainly make agreement easier to attain yet do not exist as a medium for powerful
43

change.

The conflicting interests, motives, and political makeups ofthe federal

governance and the Lander governments lead to incremental policymaking via the
threat ofBundesrat intervention. Ifconsensus is not reached in the BundesraU bills
are threatened either by the potential veto or severe alteration oftheir intended
effects, meanings, or scopes. As we will see, the role ofthe Bundesrat as an
influential force on potential legislation played an important role during the passage
of the Hartz reforms because, during that time, Schroder’s SPD did not control the
Bundesrat and saw its influence within that body dwindle with individual Lander
elections.
Another important factor in the success or failure oflegislation lies in the
German electoral system. This is chiefly due to the fact that the schedule for
elections on the Lander level is staggered to the point to where there is almost
constant campaigning on the part ofthe various parties. These elections can greatly
change the makeup ofthe Bundesrat, Furthermore, the federal elections and in the
timetables have been able to motivate parties into action that would be more or less
politically impossible given normal circumstances. This is seemingly due to the idea
that the parties attempt to present a united organization as opposed to individual
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political actors in the German system, and during an election acting upon such
44

unity” is crucial. The timing ofthese elections coupled with the timing of
legislation can greatly affect political behavior from the individual politician all the
way up to the party en masse in the face of particular reforms.
In a later chapter, it will become clear that the ability ofthe Bundesrat to act
as a veto power along with the timing ofvarious elections did much towards the
passage of the Hartz reforms.

Other Notable Veto Points
With respect to economic legislation there are numerous other veto-points
which must be “hurdled” in order to successfully enact legislation. Although not
nearly as influential as the aforementioned elements ofpolicymaking,their
significance is worthy ofnote. This section will address these other processes,
namely the German judicial system and the various “parapublic” institutions, and
briefly outline their potential to affect economic reform.
The German judicial system consists chiefly ofthree types ofcourts: Standard
criminal or civil courts, specialized courts (courts which deal with special subject
areas such as labor or patent law), and constitutional courts. The courts are
arranged in a multi-tiered system ranging from local to supreme federaljudicial
44

bodies.

44

It is important to note that, under the constitutional system ofchecks and

Edinger. West German Politics 26-27.
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balances, German judicial authority exists as an independent judiciary."^^ This
frees the German policymaking process from potentially influential court renderings
which are founded in political rather than pragmatic or judicial decisions. While all
courts in the German system serve important and varying functions, the single most
significant court is the Federal Constitutional Court {Bundesverfassungsgericht). This
court consists of sixteen judges presiding over two courts. Thejudges serve twelve
year sentences and, although they are appointed by the Bundestag and Bundesrat,
they rarely if ever follow the political wishes ofparliament or the Chancellor. This
court serves the important role of performing judicial review and possibly vetoing
any legislation passed by any house ofthe German parliament on the grounds of
46

unconstitutionality.

The last institution, or “node” as referred to by Katzenstein, ofthe German
policy network which will be expounded upon in this chapter is the collection of
various parapublic” German institutions. These parapublics chiefly serve to bridge
47

the gap between the public and private sectors,

These institutions are best

exemplified by the Federal Reserve (Deutsche Bundesbank), now defunct due to the
introduction ofthe Euro, and the Federal Labor Agency(Bundesagenturfur Arbeit)
yet are certainly not limited to those two organizations. The parapublic institutions
chiefly play a corporatist role in the legislative process,conduct research, and carry
out certain policies. In the case ofthe Hartz legislation, the BundesagenturfUr Arbeit
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had the greatest potential to enact change upon or hinder the reforms. As the
agency responsible for the management and distribution ofunemployment benefits,
it had a great potential to be significantly affected by the reforms. As we will see in a
later chapter, the Bundesagenturfur Arbeit, rather serendipitously, served to the
benefit ofSchroder’s Hartz reforms in an surpisingly untraditional way.

Conclusion
The difficulties ofenacting far reaching or comprehensive reforms in
Germany are numerous and well documented. As far as policies are concerned,
centrism is the norm and radical change is almost never an option. Keeping this in
mind,it is interesting and rather intriguing to see major labor market reform in the
form ofHartz I-IV succeeding. The Hartz reforms, were met with great controversy,
sparked debates and protests, and cost Schroder’s SPD the Chancellery and control
over the Bundestag. This is especially interesting,considering the failed Alliance for
Jobs during the first Schroder administration. The Alliance and the Hartz
Commission pursued nearly identical policies, yet only one escaped the influence of
the German veto points. The next two chapters will study both the Alliance for Jobs
and the Hartz Commission in order to determine how the Hartz reforms were not
able to elude the very processes which doomed the Alliance.
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The Alliance for Jobs

The Alliance
When elected Chancellor ofGermany in 1998,Gerhard Schroder made an
immediate commitment to structural economic reform geared towards a reduction
in unemployment. With the newly formed coalition between the SPD and the Greens
enjoying a “comfortable” 21-seat majority in the Bundestag,Schroder and his brand
of pro-market populism were able to pursue a “job creation pact” between German
48

industry and labor.

Furthermore,Schroder placed very high priority on the issue

of unemployment as a part ofGermany's six-month presidency ofthe European
49

Union, which began in 1999.

This “pact,” dubbed the Alliance for Jobs, whose

complete title is actually the Alliance for Jobs,Training and Competitiveness
{Bundnisfiir Arbeit, Ausbildung und Standortsicherung), was evidence ofa growing
50

German commitment to combating unemployment,

In addition, its title suggests

the idea that the goals ofthe Alliance were to enhance and promote Germany’s role
as the center ofEuropean economic activity. The Alliance for Jobs was an attempt
by the Schroder government to bring together varying political and corporatist
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interests in order to reach a consensus among the various interests and
ideologies as to what needed to be done to boost the lagging German economy.

The initial idea for the Alliance had come from Klaus Zwickel,the new head
ofIG Metall, as a method for potentially securing a more proactive role for the trade
unions in economic reforms. ZwickeTs initial vision involved the commitment of
employers and unions to moderate wage agreements while providing in return a
fulfillment on promises ofjob creation.^^ Endorsed by Schroder and supported by
the traditionally SPD-friendly trade unions as a way ofcreating jobs,the Alhance for
Jobs was based on a few core plans and tenets. First, the Schroder government
planned to find stable jobs for 100,000 young unemployed people. Second,the tax
and welfare-state contribution requirements for the low wage sector and the so
52

called “self-employed” were reexamined by the commission,

Third,the Alliance

analyzed the German retirement age. The Alliance, namely the Minister ofLabor at
the time of the Alliance’s formation, Walter Riester, moved to cut Germany's
retirement age from 65 years of age down to 60. Furthermore,Riester set forth
plans and ideas offunding this reduction in retirement wage through having
employees forego one percent ofthe increasing wage rate. These provisions and
actions called for by the Alliance for Jobs were more or less based on a system used
53

previously in the Netherlands which met with much success.
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The launch of the ambitious Alliance for Jobs was accompanied by
incredibly high expectations and support across the federal ministries,the employer
organizations, and the trade unions. However a weaker economic outlook at the
beginning of the Schroder administration would prove difficult for the government's
attempts to conquer unemployment, which was at the time higher than 10 percent.
54

Although optimism within the newly formed Red/Green alliance was high,
skepticism surrounding the situation was not at all rare due to a previous attempt
by the then-outgoing Chancellor Helmut Kohl to build an Alliance for Jobs of his
own. This previous commission collapsed as a result ofelevated tensions between
the unions and employers over welfare and labor cuts. Despite this failure, many
felt after Schroder’s electoral victory and the formation ofthe Red/Green alliance
that both the positions oflabor unions and employers had seemed to solidify
concerning the need for economic reform and how they wanted to see
unemployment handled. These difficulties signified that a successful creation and
implementation ofthe Alliance for Jobs would be an early test ofSchroder's political
skills and reputation as a Politischer Macher,or one who brings about change
55

through the politics ofcompromise.

Unfortunately for Schroder, his attempts to

bring about compromise would lead to the unsuccessful end ofthe Alliance for Jobs.

54

Dyson. "Binding Hands as a Strategy for Economic Reform." 229 ; McCathie, Andrew. "Schroder takes
over power as economic outlook darkens." Deutsche Presse-Aeentur 22 Oct. 1998.
McCathie, Andrew. "Schroder faces tough task in forming job alliance." Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 29
Sept. 1998 ; Dyson. "Binding Hands as a Strategy for Economic Reform." 229.
35

The Makeup of the Alliance: Typical Corporatist Policymaking

Since the Alliance for Jobs was ideally envisioned as a widely accepted set of
compromises among the federal ministries, the labor unions, and the employer
organizations, a great deal ofsignificance and influence was given to numerous
organizations and political players, each of which represented different economic
and political motives and ideologies.

First, several key members of the Schroder cabinet played crucial roles in the
Alliance for Jobs. Walter Riester,former deputy chairman ofIGMetall and the
Minister ofLabor and Social Affairs was afforded great influence within the work of
56

the Alliance as a representative oflabor interests,

Oskar Lafontaine, a leftist

member of the SPD(and the eventual parliamentary faction leader ofthe German
Left Party) was appointed as the head ofthe Federal Finance Ministry in order to
complement the more moderate stances ofSchroder and other involved ministers
while representing the ideologies ofthe more leftist faction ofthe SPD and the
57

Green party coalition members.

Bodo Hombach,Schroder’s Minister for Special

Affairs and Chiefofthe Chancellery, was assigned the responsibility to organize and
develop the Alliance. Underneath Hombach’s direction, a steering group of policy
direction made up of various groups representing particular issues was put together
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in order to determine the source ofAlliance policies. In addition, he created
what was called the “Benchmarking Group,” a division ofthe commission which was
designed to “inject new thinking.” In reality, this group sought to use the Alhance to
counteract the ideologies and actions ofLafontaine and his counterparts on the SPD
left, to promote discussion on the nature ofSchroder’s commitment to economic
modernization, and to promote the Chancellor as a public figure ofthe hopeful
reforms.58 As a centrist, Schroder elevated Hombach to his position chiefly due to his
firm stance against Lafontaine’s policies.^^ Finally,Schroder,in order to preserve his
credibility as an agent ofcompromise,chaired the top-level meetings among the
60

core players and members ofthe Alliance himself

The corporatist elements ofthe German policymaking system were

so

embedded in the legislative process that IGMetall, the most dominant
metalworkers' union in Germany and major trend-setter in national bargaining,
44

expected” employers to have full participation in the commission’s discussions
well before members of the Alliance were appointed.^^ Klaus Zwickel,the
aforementioned chairman ofIGMetall, was an active participant in the talks, and
business interests represented by people and organizations such as Dieter Schulte
of the German Trade Union Federation and Hans OlafHenkel ofthe Federation of
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German Industries were also included in the negotiations.
After nearly four years of debates, attempts to define a unified German
policy, and personnel changes the Alliance for Jobs had failed to achieve its most
ambitious goals. While some reforms were created as a result ofthe Alliance
meetings, namely the JUMP employment and training program geared towards
younger unemployed and the Job-AQTIF law for strengthened job placement, major
reforms involving issues such as wages, working hours, and retirement age were not
achieved. Although the final meeting ofthe Alliance was held in March of2003,
much of the original promise ofreform had dwindled as early as 2001. Over the
course of time in which the Alliance seemed potentially viable, it saw poorly
implemented reform strategies, the resignation or removal ofvarious Alliance
members, and a lack of(and oftentimes downright refusal to)compromise on the
part of the employer and labor interests. The lack ofcommitment on behalfofthe
commission participants became so problematic that the last meetings ofthe
Alliance saw poor attendance on the part of various groups. The very last meeting
63

even lacked a formal agenda.

In order to comprehend the failure ofthe Alliance for Jobs,it is important to
understand some ofthe reasoning behind the use ofa commission to implement
public policy. As has been mentioned above,the German system oflegislation
establishes numerous influential actors with veto points. The number ofand the
62 ..
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scope ofinfluence afforded to these players, both within and apart from the
federal government,force German policies, especially those involving labor and/or
social issues, to be created incrementally and to a much lesser extent than in many
developed democracies. The veto points over which Schroder seemingly had the
greatest concerns were those involving the authority ofrepresentatives ofboth the
labor unions and employer federations, along with the influence ofhis own party
64

and coalition partners.

Early in the struggle to create broad labor and social reforms.Chancellor
Schroder viewed his own party to be a “hindrance rather than a source ofeconomic
reform ideas” with a “long-term public image problem ofgoverning competence.”
The ongoing strife between the “modernizers” and “traditionalists” within the SPD
caused Schroder to feel as if he and his party were losing credibility and greatly
65

affected his ability to trust his party as a vehicle for reform.

In order to circumvent this potential political hurdle,Schroder attempted to
bring about his reforms through social balance. This balance, he felt, was the only
way to coax reluctant traditionalists to accept the far-reaching reforms
encompassed within the Alliance for Jobs. He felt that the best way to bring about
this social balance was by forging a compromise between the employer
66

organizations and the labor unions.
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This would turn out to be quite problematic
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for Schroder, as the interests ofthe labor unions and employers were too
varied and opposed to one another to promote much in the way ofconcessions.

The main grievance of the labor unions was the unwillingness ofthe
employers and the federal government to lower the retirement age and adjust the
wages for industrial workers in Germany. Klaus Zwickel, as the Alliance
representative for IGMetall, was accustomed to behaving as the “large and militant
union that is accustomed to decades ofinfluence in the Chancellor's center-left
Social Democratic Party.” He and other labor union representatives stood firmly
behind a plan which demanded a reduction ofthe German retirement age from 65 to
60 years. Knowing these reforms would not meet the favor ofthe trade and
industrial federation interests in the Alliance,Zwickel threatened to lobby for very
costly wage raises in future Alliance meetings and other various commissions or
policymaking meetings if approval ofthe "retire at 60" plan could not be obtained.
Aside from the pleas for a lowered retirement age and the threats ofhiked wage
demands,the union interests pressed hard for a “three-year period ofmoderate
raises” for various industrial jobs. Industry leaders were reluctant for many
reasons but most significantly cited the projected increases in input costs for the
various German industries. Several estimates have this increase in costs at nearly

40

67

€5.6 billion over five years.

This complex wage conflict was central to the

68

demise of the Alliance.

As a result of the lack ofcompromise among Alliance members,Zwickel
accused Schroder of siding with industry which,in the eyes of union interests.
would be contradictory to the longstanding close relationship between the SPD and
labor unions in the Federal Republic. Zwickel would then vow to boycott the next
round of talks “because all the possibilities for compromise(had) been sounded
out.,»69

The various federal ministries would prove to be difficult for Schroder and
the SPD modernizers during these attempted reforms. The Ressortprinzip of
individual departmental responsibility kept the prerogatives ofthe various
ministries separate from those ofthe Chancellery. The leftist ideologies ofFinance
Minister Oskar Lafontaine led to what has been described as “contemptuous
70

indifference” on his part towards the reforms ofthe Alliance.

This indifference led

to differences between him and the Chancellor, which in turn led to his 1999
resignation.^^ His successor,Hans Eichel, although a supporter ofthe structural
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reforms promoted by the SPD modernizers, used EU fiscal rules to avoid
72

committing himself or his ministry to new programs of public investment

The ministry of Labor and Social affairs under Walter Riester was equally as
hindering to compromise. His ministry promoted reforms which were aligned to
what is known as the “lump oflabor” theory.’^ This theory, generally considered
fallacious by economists, is based on the idea that there is a fibced amount of work
available causing a “lump” oflabor. This would mean that a reduction in working
hours would provide firms with a need to hire more employees in order to make up
for the lost work and thus reduce unemployment’"^ The plans proposed on the basis
of this theory were very much in line with the wishes ofthe labor union interests
participating in the Alliance for Jobs while being naturally against the motives and
plans put forth by the various trade federation and employer representatives. For
this reason, Walter Riester served as a very polarizing figure within the Alliance.

The coalition partner ofthe SPD,the Greens, also served little to promote the
advancement of the Alliance. The German Green party has always been weak as far
as economic reforms are concerned and seriously “lacked a powerful economic
portfolio.” Since the reforms ofthe Alliance saw their roots in economic
policymaking, the Green party had very little opportunity to present itself within the
Alliance. Therefore, Schroder’s own coalition partner lacked any real incentive to
72
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see the Alliance develop or succeed on behalfofthe coalition government. It
is fair to note that although the Green party was not a party which promoted the
75

policies of the Alliance for jobs, it was also not a major hindrance either.

The Timing of the Alliance: Unfavorable Electoral Influence
Along with its design and makeup,the timetable ofthe Alliance for Jobs was
simply not favorable enough to promote its success. While it is understood that
certain issues and compromises inherent to the German system would require a
great deal of time to work around, the Alliance for Jobs lasted nearly five years.
Furthermore, the Alliance produced little results given the amount oftime with
which it and its members had to work. These delays were chiefly due to the inability
oflabor and employer interests to agree on what reforms should be made and to
what extent they should benefit laborers. The continuing delays and renegotiations
lasted longer than many could have anticipated and began to interfere with the
hopes of the SPD in the then-upcoming 2002 federal election cycle. With his
reputation and credibility as a bringer of political compromise and the pro-labor
image of the SPD in serious jeopardy,Schroder was led to decide to,for electoral
reasons, suspend reforms concerning labor and/or social reforms until what he
76

hoped would be a second term as Chancellor.
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Along those same lines, one could also argue that the timing in the
creation of the Alliance for Jobs did not serve to its benefit. Having been established
shortly after Schroder’s 1998 electoral victory,the pressures ofan imminent
election present during the downfall ofthe Alliance were not evident during its
beginning. Typically, parties must present a united front in the face ofelections in
Germany due to the system of proportional representation within XhQ Bundestag.
This system has voters elect the parties rather than the individual politicians,
placing great pressure on the parties as far as policy definitions are concerned.
While Lander elections could certainly be expected to occur during the early stages
of the Alliance (as early as the spring of 1999), the federal elections were years
away,thus allowing for greater division within the party. Ifthe policies ofthe
Alliance had been presented at a more advantageous time,it could be argued that
the members of the SPD opposed to economic modernization would have simply
accepted certain reforms to promote the electorally favorable image ofa united
party.
As we will see with the Hartz Commission,a favorable electoral timetable can
certainly influence policymaking by “binding in” various actors who,under normal
circumstances, would not at all support certain reforms. This is especially true
when considering the division between Schroder’s economic modernizing wing of
the SPD and the more-traditional left wing.

Conclusion
44

The Failure of the Alliance for Jobs,Training, and Competitiveness can
best be attributed to the inability ofthe commission members,namely the labor
unions and industrial federations, to reach a suitable agreement on issues over
which they possess a great deal ofinfluence. In addition,interests ofthe various
pertinent federal ministries and the Green party were not sufficiently in sync with
those ofSchroder, causing a disappointing lack ofcommitment on their part.
Schroder and the modernizers ofthe SPD had brought the various interest groups
and governmental players together in order to hopefully solidify a compromise and
lock a great deal of potential opponents ofAlhance plans into his hopeful reforms.
The lengthy and fruitless discussions coupled with an approaching federal election
cycle doomed the Alliance for Jobs.

The inability ofthe Alliance to bring about

meaningful progress during this time raised many fears that the various conflicting
interest groups within the German political society were “eroding Germany's
»77

revered consensus tradition.

This, however,would not stop Chancellor

Schroder’s commitment to economic modernization. During his next term, a
commission put together by Schroder and led by his former colleague at
Volkswagen,Peter Hartz, would attempt to enact social and labor reformsjust as
with the failed Alliance. This time, government by commission would succeed. The
next chapter will explore the Hartz Commission and the tools it used to reach the
success desired by Schroder in his creation ofthe Alliance for Jobs, Training, and
Competitiveness.
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Lastly, it is important to reiterate how typical the Alliance truly was.
Numerous commissions of this nature were put together not only during the
Schroder administration but throughout the history of modern German
policymaking in order to hammer out economic reforms. In addition, many ofthose
groups were not successful in reaching their goals due to the constraints placed on
the German system. The primary reason the Alliance for Jobs,from among dozens of
other typically failed commissions, was chosen for this work is simply the context in
which it existed. The Alliance,just as with Hartz, was an attempt by the Schroder
government to enact certain reforms which were geared at lowering the
unemployment rate in Germany. This is important to note because, while many
commissions have failed to enact real change in modern Germany,the Alliance for
Jobs bears a striking resemblance to the Hartz Commission. Ifthe AlHance for Jobs
was part of“the rule,” then the success ofthe Hartz Commission was most certainly
the exception.” This ability ofthe Hartz Commission to break free from the
restraints which bound the Alliance is the subject ofthe following chapter.
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The Hartz Commission

The Commission
If the Alliance for Jobs,Training, and Competitiveness is to be viewed as a
failure to create much needed reform through commission driven policies, the
reforms devised under the Hartz Commission on Modern Services in the Labor
Market {Kommission Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt)can be easily
classified as a success. Whereas the Alliance for Jobs was simply not able to design
strong reforms due to a failure to reach a sort ofcompromise on major issues, the
Hartz Commission was undeniably able to reach a desired set ofsweeping reforms
that were not only drafted into law, but have also drawn comparisons to other far78

reaching, conservative economic reforms such as Reaganomics and Thatcherism.

As German policymakers prefer “non-decisions,incrementalism and the
middle ground to radical change and zero-sum games,” especially when dealing
with reform ofthe famed German welfare state,the reforms pursued by the
Schroder administration were obviously going to be quite difficult to derive and
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implement.

The attempts towards reform by the first Schroder government

failed and quickly (and, ironically enough,fortunately)fell out ofthe public spotlight
due to the federal elections of2003. Shortly after his narrow re-election victory.
Schroder reaffirmed his commitment to economic reforms by introducing the
Agenda 2010 program, which was designed to modernize the German welfare state.
especially with regard to unemployment insurance. Agenda 2010 drew heavily on
the work of the Hartz commission, which was first assembled in 2002 and was
modeled in a fashion similar to the Alliance for Jobs. With representatives from the
political sphere, employer organizations,labor organizations, and even academia,
the Hartz Commission and its similar makeup was seemingly doomed to failjust as
the Alliance for Jobs had failed.

80

But it turned out differently. The recommendations ofthe Hartz Commission
would lead to the passage offour separate pieces oflegislation, appropriately titled
Hartz I-IV. While Hartz I-III were relatively uncontroversial,the fourth element of
the Hartz concept,Hartz IV, met with a great deal ofobjection and uneasiness.

Success in Commission Makeup
The makeup of the Hartz Commission represented a great divergence from
not only the makeup ofthe Alliance for Jobs itself, but also from the policies and
79
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methods that it pursued for reforms. The differences between the two are
chiefly a result of the strong tripartite makeup ofthe Alliance for Jobs and the
eventual inability to make concessions or reach compromises to which its makeup
led.
Peter Hartz, then the head of personnel for Volkswagen, was asked to lead
Schroder's commission and to report on a series of“modern services for the labor
market.

Along with being given the reins to the commission,Hartz was allowed

to choose the Commission members and define the mission and agenda ofthe
organization. As the director of personnel at Volkswagen,Hartz was able to hammer
out successful reforms of the company, preventing previous projections ofjob loss
and/or outsourcing that affected the German automaker. As a result ofhis
successes in the private sector, Hartz was labeled a compromiser and an innovator
and Schroder hoped that these qualities, along with Hartz’s modernist approach.
82

would lead to the Commission success.

With only fifteen separate members,the Hartz Commission was relatively
small. This smaller makeup avoided the tripartite principle ofthe Alliance and
instead opted for the inclusion ofSPD modernizers(such as the Minister ofLabor
for the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia,Harald Schartau), modernizers
within the trade federations and labor unions(such as Peter Gasse and Eberhard
Schleyer, leaders within IGMetall and the 2DH,respectively), management
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consultants (such as Dr. Jobst Fiedler ofRoland Berger Strategy Consultants),
and members of academia with expertise in labor market policy(such as Dr. Werner
Jann of the University ofPotsdam and Dr.Gunther Schmid ofthe Social Science
Research Center of Berlin).^^ This was all geared towards enacting reforms that
suited the wishes Schroder had for the Alliance for Jobs all under the guidance ofthe
Commission’s namesake,Peter Hartz.

As the leader of the Commission, with the explicit ability to appoint
essentially whomever he pleased, Hartz was able to completely exclude the
troublesome leadership of the German Confederation ofTrade Unions,IGMetall,
and Walter Riester’s Ministry ofLabor and Social Affairs. These agencies and
leaders, which were unable to reach an agreement in the Alhance for Jobs, had a
much reduced influence over the decisions made by Hartz and his commission
members. This degree of power and influence ofHartz as chair ofthe Commission
allowed him to act as a “motor ofreform” as opposed to a performing as a
moderator similarly to how Schroder performed in the Alliance for Jobs. Because of
this, Hartz was able to garner an initial agreement on “core principles” for the
direction ofthe Commission from his members and guide the work ofhis
commission to adhere to the accomplishment ofgoals, which adhered to those
84

principles.
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Success in Timing
Just as timing played a crucial role in the downfall ofthe Alliance for Jobs,the
time in which the Hartz Commission was assembled could perhaps not been more
favorable for Chancellor Schroder and the SPD modernizers. As the Alliance for Jobs
was on its proverbial last leg in early 2002, much ofthe focus ofthe SPD left
economic concerns and turned towards the upcoming federal elections. Schroder’s
reputation as a compromiser and an economic modernizer were seriously damaged
by the embarrassingly ineffective Alliance, yet this was not able to deter him from
85

continuing to bring about economic reform through commission derived policies.

Schroder’s opportunity to create a new,effective commission on labor
reform came with the crisis of the Federal Labor Institution’s failure injob
placement policies. Seemingly coinciding with one ofseveral embarrassingly
unproductive Alliance for Jobs meetings, the Federal Audit Court ofGermany
discovered in January of2002 that the Institution had falsified many statistics onjob
placements. Simply put,their job placement policies had failed to such an extent
that they were fixing the numbers to cover up their inadequacies. At this point, all of
Germany realized that the level of unemployment was actually significantly higher
than the statistics had led people to believe. This led to the resignation ofthe chair
of the Institution and gave Schroder the opportunity to promote Florian Gerster, an
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economic modernizer within the SPD,as the new head of the Institution.
86

Gerster was expected to make immediate reforms within the Institution.

It was at this time that Schroder asked Hartz to direct and lead his
87

commission.

By removing himselffrom the reform process and putting in his

stead a member of the private sector, Schroder effectively removed the commission
from many of the obligations or expectations that could have occurred with
associated interests groups or political parties. Furthermore,the “crisis
atmosphere” created by the failed Federal Labor Institution put the trade unions
and employer administrations who sought tripartite agreements towards labor
market reforms “on the defensive.

88

Now Schroder and the modernizers could

demonstrate and utilize the growing sense of urgency towards agreement on reform
by taking power away from Riester’s Ministry,IGMetall, and the German
Confederation ofTrade Unions.

Simply put, the failure ofthe Federal Labor Institution gave Schroder a
window of opportunity to regain his credibility as an effective compromiser and
economic modernizer by removing the influential individuals and organizations that
worked against his compromising system during the Alliance for Jobs.
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Binding the Hands” of Potential Opposition
Kenneth Dyson, in his work with German Politics, deals extensively with what
he describes as “binding the hands” of potential opposition to,in this case, economic
reform. He, along with numerous other scholars in this field, explains that, being a
semi-sovereign state driven by consensus politics,Germany is subject to “powerful,
entrenched interests” which act as “veto players” in many situations. Despite this,
Dyson hypothesizes that it is possible to “bind in potential opponents” to otherwise
»89

veto-subject reforms “within larger processes that have their own dynamics.

With concerns to the reforms proposed by the Hartz Commission,Schroder
and the SPD modernizers were faced with the task ofeither appeasing,removing,or
“binding in” the various interest groups at hand and the economically traditionalist
elements ofthe SPD in order to see their passage. With the creation ofthe Hartz
Commission effectively removing the influence ofthe various interest groups,
Schroder would use the timescale ofthe 2002 federal elections coupled with a labor
market crisis, the restructuring of his federal cabinet, and the rise ofinfluence ofthe
CDU/CSU in the Bundesrat to “bind” the traditionalist members ofthe SPD into
90

accepting his reforms.
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Going into the elections, the SPD seemed doomed to lose to a rising
91

CDU/CSU.

Schroder, Hartz, and other SPD modernizers were able to commit the

traditionalists to their economic reforms in order to present a united SPD for
electoral purposes. Furthermore, much ofthe energy ofthe party was dedicated to
concentrate on the election giving Hartz a great deal offreedom to work with his
Commission. With this freedom, Hartz used the urgency of upcoming elections to
enforce a “strict discipline ofconfidential teamwork” to promote the “principle of
unanimity in its conclusions.” Although he was given so much freedom,Hartz made
the politically wise decision to regularly consult with SPD leaders, especially
Schroder (with whom he had a “very close personal” relationship), to “ensure that
the commission was sensitive to overall political constraints.”^^ In short, the SPD
needed to quickly recover from the labor market crisis caused by the embarrassing
failure of the Federal Labor Institution in order to maintain control after the 2002
federal elections. The work of the Hartz Commission gave them a timely method to
show the voting populace some sort of dedication to economic improvement.
AJfter the narrow election victory ofthe SPD in October of2002,Schroder had
more time to ensure the implementation ofthe Hartz reforms and took full
advantage ofthe new opportunity to restructure his federal cabinet to fit more
93

closely with his ideologies.
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and his ministry with the Alliance for Jobs,Schroder eliminated his Federal
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Economics Ministry led by the
independent, Werner Miiller.*^'* He then created the new Ministry ofEconomics and
Labor. To head this new Ministry,Schroder appointed Wolfgang Clement,a fellow
SPD modernizer, with hopes that Clement would be able to work the four pieces of
95

legislation drawn up by the Hartz Commission through the Bundestag.

Since certain elements of the Hartz legislation,

ArbeitslosengeldU

(Unemployment Compensation II) as a federal state administered service, were
subject to Bundesrat veto,Schroder and Hartz would need a great deal ofSPD
commitment within the Bundesrat for the Hartz reforms to succeed.In February of
2003, the SPD lost a majority ofBundesrat representation when the CDU/CSU won
provincial elections Lower Saxony and Hesse,giving the opposition party a strong
Bundesrat majority. This growing majority could easily be used by the conservatives
to garner even further concession in labor market reforms, which would perhaps be
more difficult for the SPD traditionalists to swallow than the Hartz legislation.
Ideologically speaking, many SPD modernizers were more in line with the ordoliberals ofthe CDU/CSU. In December of2004,after a “marathon all-night sitting” of
the arbitration committee between the Bundestag md Bundesrat,the Hartz reforms
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were passed through parliament.

Schroder,Hartz, and the modernizers had

effectively used the rising influence of the CDU/CSU in the

to bind the

traditionalists of the SPD to the Hartz reforms through concerns that more
conservative labor market concessions could be made ifthe arbitration committee
were given enough time.

Conclusion
The success of the Hartz Commission on Modern Services in the Labor
Market can best be summed up by explaining how the makeup ofthe Commission
itself, together with the timing of the Commission’s work, allowed the divisive Hartz
legislation to successfully pass through the difficult German legislative process.
Whereas the Alliance for Jobs failed in policymaking as a typical victim ofdifficult,
interest-driven politics, Hartz succeeded. As the outright leader ofthe Commission,
Peter Hartz was given full control as to who would participate in the Commission’s
work and who would not. This effectively weakened the major anti-modernization
forces of top brass within IGMetall and Riester’s troublesome ministry by excluding
them altogether from the process. The blessing-in-disguise ofthe collapsed
Bundesagenturfur Arbeit gave Schroder and his colleagues the necessary timing and
sense of urgency to establish such a committee. In addition, the threat ofan
intensifying CDU/CSU within the Bundestag and during the federal elections of2002
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allowed Schroder to “bind” the economic traditionalists oftheSPDinto the
passage of the reforms proposed by the Hartz Commission.

It is important to note that very specific and mostly unusual circumstances
were at play during the creation and passage ofthe Hartz legislation. Without the
steadfast and politically astute drive ofChancellor Gerhard Schroder,the
management skills of Peter Hartz, the downfall oiX\[QBimdesagenturfiirArbeiUWi!^
the pressure of an imminent election on the opposition within the SPD,the Hartz
reforms would have suffered a fate similar if not identical to that ofthe reforms
attempted through the Alliance for Jobs.

The difficulty ofimplementing social reforms on the level ofthe Hartz
reforms can be easily observed by the controversy they were able to generate. The
Hartz reforms, most notably Hartz IV,spawned debates and protests while leading
to the downfall of the Schroder Chancellery and the parliamentary control enjoyed
by the SPD. It can be said without much objection or doubt that the process
surro unding the Hartz Commission and the legislation it
unusual in modern Germany.
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was able to pass were quite

Hartz I-IV: The Legislation and the Controversy

The Hartz reforms enacted many changes on a very grand scale throughout
Germany. The restructuring ofgovernment agencies, reduction ofunemployment
and social security benefits, and the implementation of more activejob creation
programs were all core tenets of the Hartz legislations. As a nation which has for
quite some time been characterized as a large welfare state, such policies were
bound to cause a great rift within the German populace. This chapter will explore
the nature of the reforms themselves as well as explain the effects they had on the
German political landscape.

Hartz I-IV
Hartz I and Hartz II both came into effect within only one year ofthe
founding ofthe Hartz Commission on January 1,2003. Both ofthese reforms aimed
97

to make newer jobs easier to create.

Hartz I promoted the foundation of“Staff

Service agencies”(Personal-Service-Agenturen or PSA’s)to promote job creation and
placement.^^ Furthermore, Hartz I sought to further vocational training and the
provision ofsubsistence payments through the Job Agency
97
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was already in place.

Hartz II defined lower income “Mini-and Midi-Jobs’

which were to have lower taxes and insurance payments enacted upon those
employed in such jobs, provided for an entrepreneurial grant known as the *7cMG”
(loosely translated as “Me Incorporated"), and created morejobs centers to aid the
currently unemployed. These reforms met little objection and were enacted in little
100

over one month from their proposal(November 29,2002-January 1,2003).

Hartz III came into effect exactly one year after Hartz I and II. These reforms
sought to restructure the Federal Labor Institution {Bundesanstaltjur Arbeit ox
101

Arbeitsamt).

Much of the restructuring dealt with providing the German

government with more checks over the Institution and attempting to make the
actions of the Institution more efficient.102 This was primarily accomplished
through limitations on institutional autonomy,the loss ofcontrol over budgeting,
and the conversion of the parapublic institution to a three-tiered federal agency.
Since the Institution would become a true agency of the federal government,the
name Bundesanstaltjur Arbeit was changed into Bmdesagenturfur Arbeit ^o&ox^\
Labor Agency). This reform also, with some controversy,shifted the burden of
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proof on whether an unemployed laborer was actually seeking work from the
Labor Agency to the actual unemployed laborer him/herself.

103

Hartz IV, being concerned primarily with federal unemployment benefits,
was naturally the most divisive and controversial element ofthe Hartz Commission.
This reform argued that unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed
(Arbeitsloshilfe) and means-tested social security income support(5ozifl/M/e)should
be combined into a scries of single payments. Furthermore,this reform calls for the
shortening of the length of time during which one can receive the unemployment
benefits.104

As the previous system stood, one could receive for anywhere between 12
and 32 months—depending on the age and previous employment ofthe recipient—
worth of the full unemployment pay. This ranged from 60 to 67% ofthe previous
net salary of the claimant. This was then followed by a series of unemployment
benefits, which were approximately 55% ofthe same previous net salary. Hartz IV,
through the combination ofthe benefits and the shortening ofthe duration of
receipt restricted the full unemployment pay {cd\\QdArbeitslosengeldI,OT
‘TJnemployment Compensation I,” under Hartz IV)to a general 12 months with a 6month extension available exclusively to workers over the age of55
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Once the time period ot'ihe ArheitslosengeldI

QxpuedythQ

payments would be lowered to a level similar to that ofihQ pitviousSozialhilfe,
which was up to €345 per month with a stipend to cover what is described as
“adequate” housing. This series of payments (Arbeitslosengeld U)vfzs svsahhlQ only
106

to claimants who met certain qualifications.

These qualities are namely the level

of his or her savings, life insurance, and the income ofthe claimant’s spouse. Onlyif
the state deems a person in need of such help after reviewing these criteria, then
107

will the claimant receive the ArbeitslosengeldII.

Furthermore,to receive the

Arbeitslosengeld II payments applicants can be forced to accept anyjob regardless of
the adequacy of the pay it offers and the level ofprevious vocational training the
applicant may have. The primary argument behind this move was to lower the
assistance one would receive in order to encourage an active search for work.

108

Controversy
Controversy surrounding the Hartz legislation, especially controversy
concerning Hartz IV, arose seemingly as soon as the legislation was implemented if
not beforehand. Besides the obvious objections coming from welfare-state
traditionalists within Schroder’s SPD and labor unions such as IGMetall,protests
against the reforms broke out virtually across Germany. The‘'Monday
Demonstrations,” as they were commonly referred to, began in the summer of2004,
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shortly after the legislation was passed. These demonstrations began in
Berlin and spread to well over 100 difTerent cities within the Federal Republic.
Many ofSchroder’s and the SPD's traditional supporters who showed initial
support for the legislation began to wane in their backing ofthe legislation.This
initial backlash coupled with an upcoming electoral season seemed to strand
Schroder, Hart/., and the supporters of Hartz IV as the supposed saboteurs ofthe
German welfare state.

10')

The decreasing support for Schroder became fully evident with the results of
the 2005 federal election cycle. The election cycle in itself was even a glaringly
obvious byproduct of the failing SPD in that it was triggered by a failed vote of
no
confidence in the German Bundestag(which triggers an early election cycle).
These elections saw the CDU/CSU led by Angela Merkel win a narrow margin of
victory over the SPD. Although defeated, the SPD would get some solace in just how
narrow the margin of victory was (close to 1%)‘*^ and the fact that they would still
be part of the governing coalition as a part ofthe newly formed Grand Coalition of
112

the CDU/CSU and SPD.

This shift of power within the RMwt/es/flg demonstrated

what has been described as an “electoral backlash against Agenda 2010 and the
Hartz IV labor market reform” and has been cited as proofthat the German
populace is “unprepared to countenance remedial measures involving reform and
109
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retrenchment in the welfare slate.

This electoral reaction to the Agenda 2010 reforms,specificallyHartzIV,
demonstrates both how important public opinion is in the passage ofeconomic
reform and how unpopular such reforms can be. It has been argued that,even
despite the weakening German economy and labor market,the German public is
“unprepared to countenance remedial measures involving reform and retrenchment
-1 14

in the welfare stale.

If this is the case, then why would Schroder and his SPD

modernizers pursue such a policy and, even more importantly,how would they go
about doing so?
Schroder felt that the best method of drawing up such reforms lay in
commission politics. Ifthe various “veto powers” that exist in Germany were to
widely support a significant piece of legislation, a commission that represented all of
the interests at hand would be necessary. In fact, his style of
commission” is not at all uncommon in Germany and was

government by

certainly commonplace

during the Schroder administration with the implementation of32 separate
115

commissions on numerous different issues.

The difficulty ofits passage and the division it created

within the SPD clearly

illustrate just how controversial the Hartz Commission proved to be Germans have
always been protective and resistant to change in their welfare state and the
reaction to the Hartz legislations, most notably Hartz IV,is no exception The
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Institute for liconomic Research in Halle determined that the average long
term unemployed laborer who qualifies for the provisions set forth by the Hartz
legislation would receive approximately €350 per month whereas,before the
reforms, they would receiv e on average €530 per month. Naturally,this drastic
reduction in payment would be unpopular. The popularity ofChancellorSchrSder,
Peter Hartz, and the SPD plummeted in 2004 and 2005 sparking protests
1 1(>

throughout Germany.

While controversial and quite difficult to implement,the series oflegislation
drawn up by Hartz Commission proved Schroder to be an astute politician. His keen
understanding of the German policyniaking system and his apparent penchant for
good timing allowed him to implement reforms which,although terribly unpopular,
he and his supports felt were for the betterment ofGermany and the promotion of
Standort Deutschland.

Conclusion: Hartz Since 2005
Although the policies promoted and implemented by the Hartz Commission
were controversial enough to cost Schroder the Chancellorship and the SPD their
parliamentary majority, many have argued that the legislation has,in general,
benefltted Germany despite the initial backlash. In 2007,the number of
unemployed Germans dipped below 4 million for the first time in five years. This
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was heralded by the Merkel administration as a result of wage restraints and
the adoption of more flexible work practices by private enterprises. These numbers
naturally meant good things for Chancellor Merkel at the polls but many non
conservatives were not “buying it." During this dip in unemployment,there were
talks and speculations, especially by Vice Chancellor Franz Miintefering,that the
Hartz reforms pushed through by Schroder as Chancellor were “finally paying

off.

17

Whatever the case may be, this period of time saw a significant increase in

the public approval in the reduction of welfare benefits. This is chiefly evident with
an 11% increase in the popularity of welfare reduction policies among the German
populace in the early part of 2004. Although still a controversial topic,the work of
the Hartz Commission, in the eyes of many,is viewed as a success, albeit not an
immediate one.
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Conclusion
As wc have seen, far-reaching reforms concerned with issues surrounding
the German economy, labor market, and/or welfare state are indeed possible under
certain circumstances. While Germany is oftentimes described as a country whose
government is geared towards incremental policy changes,Gerhard Schroder’s
Hartz I-IV enacted great change in a short period oftime. What makes the work of
the Hartz Commission even more unusual is the fact that the Alliance for Jobs, a
similar vessel geared towards such change during the earlier Schdder government,
failed just before the Hartz Commission took shape. The shortcomings ofthe
Alliance are an obvious result of the German incrementalist system which reined it
in and rendered it weak. If the unsuccessful Alliance for Jobs was a typical result of
the German policymaking process, the successful Hartz Commission was anything
but.

Alliance for Jobs: A Failure
Ofcourse, the initial attempts at large scale labor market reforms were with
the Alliance for Jobs. This program, designed to reduce unemployment through a
variety of benefits and reforms failed after nearly five years offruitless deliberation
because of the reluctance of the German system (and,to a lesser extent, populace)to
66

move towards major economic reforms. The Alliance for Jobs was typical of
the German system not only in that it brought together varying interest groups in an
effort to create reform through consensus politics, but also in the fact that the
strength and “anti-incremental” nature ofthe proposed reforms caused the Alliance
1 i‘j

to fail miserably.
The Alliance failed to work on account ofseemingly every German “veto
player” disrupting the policymaking process within the Alliance. The corporatist
inclusion of the trade agencies and labor unions in the system would prove to be the
most troublesome. With a failure on agreement and lack ofcommunication between
the two groups, most notably IGMetall on behalfoflabor and the BDIon behalfof
industry, no sort of real wage agreement could be met. Furthermore,Schroder
would be labeled by labor interests as giving in to the interests ofindustry, a near
blasphemy in the eyes of traditional Social Democrats.*^®
Schroder would also have difficulties with his various ministries, notably that
of his Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine and his Labor and Social Affairs Minister
Walter Riester. These ministers either used their constitutionally granted
Ressortprinzip ofindividual department responsibility or their ideological distance
121

from the reforms themselves as a method of avoiding support for the Alliance.

Even though Schroder took measures to combat this, specifically replacing Finance
Minister Lafontaine with a person more in line with his economic ideologies in Hans
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Eichel,

the lack of cooperation among Schroder and his ministries would be

quite damaging to the Alliance.
Even the SPD-Green alliance showed little support for the Alliance for Jobs.
Within the SPD there was there were many detractors from the Alliance proposals.
Furthermore, the Green party had not yet established itselfas a party ofeconomic
reform or modernity; therefore it had little, ifany,interest in the Alliance and saw
123

little to its potential success.

These party disagreements served to hurt the

Alliance and could have been especially damaging to the reforms ifnon-friendly
legislation in the eyes ofSPD traditionalists and Greens were to be brought forth in
the Bundesrat.
In short, a lack of support on behalfofcorporatist interests, various
ministries, and members ofSchroder’s own SPD and Green coalition partner
contributed to the failure of the Alliance for Jobs.

Hartz Commission: A Success
As the Alliance for Jobs was put to rest by certain forces within the German
legislative system, the Hartz Commission would benefit from those forces as well as
be blessed with the grace of, simply put, good timing. The Hartz Commission,in its
success, demonstrates that, under certain circumstances,the German system of
incremental economic policy change can either be circumvented or,in specific
122
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situations, even

to pass otherwise “impassable” legislation.

First, the tripiiftite makeup ofinterests behind the Alliance for Jobs was
avoided with the Hartz Commission. The size ofthe Commission was kept small in
order to bettcr allow its ideological and planning leader,Peter Hartz,to guide the its
policies and actions. Furthermore, Hartz was given the freedom to choose who
could and could not be a part of his Commission. Although public policymakers,
labor interests, and employer federations were all representedjustas withthe
Alliance, the Hartz Commission opted to include economic modernizers and those
who Hartz knew would be more ideologically in tune with him and the Chancellor.
This means that IG Metall was still, in fact, represented on the Conunissionbut
simply not by their more polarizing and idealistic leader,Klaus Zwickel. In addition
to the typical elements of the corporatist German system,the Commission had
representatives from both management consultant agencies and members of
124

academia who served as labor market policy experts.

Secondly,one of the very elements ofthe Alliance for Jobs which helped lead
to its end served greatly to the benefit ofthe Hartz Commission. The timing ofthe
2002 federal election cycle had arguably the greatest impact on the ability ofthe
Hartz Commission to unanimously draft passable legislation that would have
otherwise died in the implementation stage. In addition,the discovery by the
Federal Audit Court of Germany that the Federal Labor Institution had falsified
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certain labor siaiisiics, essentially proving that theirjob placement methods
were not working and that unemployment in the Federal Republic was higher than
everyone had previously anticipated, gave Schroder and Hartz the necessary fuel for
their “fire of urgency." Along with those developments,the rising influence ofthe
CDU/CSU within the Bumlcsrat after the 2003 state elections saw the need for the
SPD traditionalists to support the modernizing reforms in order to keep further
125

conservative concessions from being made.
The oncoming federal elections led to a dwindling in support by much ofthe
SPD(and certainly the Greens) for the already dying Alliance for Jobs. This change
in focus by the SPD allowed Schroder to promote his commission derived policies
through Peter Hartz, effectively removing the work ofthe Hartz Commission from
the mainstream of his administration and the SPD as a party. Furthermore,the
failed Federal Labor Institution created a critical air which allowed him to create the
Hartz commission with little resistance or criticism. Now,Schroder,Hartz, and the
SPD modernizers could place the traditionalists and the stubborn labor
representatives on the defensive for not actively promoting change within the
German labor market which, during an election season,is quite a heinous crime to
commit. This gave them nearly free license to remove some ofthe most influential
126

veto players from the labor market reform process.

As the federal elections of2002 gave Schroder ample cause to allow Peter
Hartz to create his commission, the state {ox Lander)elections of2003 gave the
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Hartz reforms ample opportunity to work their way through the
the house of parliament that represents the states. During these elections,the SPD
lost their representative majorities in two federal states, allowing the CDU/CSUto
greatly strengthen their Bumlesnit ma}OT\iy. The CDU/CSU,being the more
conservative ofGermany’s two, large “catch-all” parties, generally promotes freemarket economic liberalism as is popular among business interests. This,grouped
with the obvious fact that many ofSchroder’s SPD modernizer counterparts were
economically more in line with CDU/CSU policies caused many within the SPD to
worry that the Bundesrat-Bimdestag arbitration committee would be used to give
businesses and other conservative interests more concessions than the Hartz
127

legislations already provided for.

In essence,the SPD quickly pushed the Hartz

reforms through the Bimdesrat in order to prevent it from becoming an even more
conservative piece of economic reform at the hands ofthe rising CDU/CSU. These
elections and the effects they had on the Hartz legislation are a rare instance ofthe
German political system working towards the benefit ofnon-incremental and
controversial policymaking.
Lastly, the success of the Commission as opposed to the Alliance can be
attributed to the cunning ofPeter Hartz and the political astuteness ofChancellor
Schroder. Hartz, having garnered an impressive reputation as a leader in innovative
policymaking as the head of personnel at Volkswagen, was able to parlay his skills in
the private sector to the Hartz Commission. He was able to act as the “motor” for
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reform as opposed to the “moderator” for reform as Schroder had been with
the Alliance for Jobs. He provided the Commission, which in itself was ofhis own
design, with a series of“core principles” in order to guarantee a solid, unanimous
128

approach to reform.

Schroder demonstrated his steadfast dedication to economic

modernization and his political astuteness by announcing the Agenda 2010 reforms
when he did. In the wake ofthe failed Federal Labor Institution and with a looming
federal election cycle, the introduction of potentially wide-felt economic reform
would almost be welcomed. Schroder understood the dii05culty and hostility ofsuch
a climate and knew that he would be more than able to promote such reforms even
though the Alliance for Jobs was technically, although not in practice, still ongoing.

The Unusual Nature of“Government by Commission”
The Hartz Reforms, especially Hartz IV,are certainly unusual reforms within
the Federal Republic. For decades,Germany has been characterized by an
incremental system of policymaking with gradually-changing and consensus-laden
legislation being most definitely the norm. This is especially true with economic
reforms, thus the anomaly. The idea of“government by commission,” especially
with respects to economic reforms,is not at all new within the Federal Republic.
This style of governance,Dyson argues, reflects a “response to the complex
policymaking structures ofGermany and the manifold veto points that they offered
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to powerful organized interests.
Although these commissions may be typical in their given setting, when the
pursued policies attempt to break the status quo ofsorts, the commission system
collapses and the infamous Reformstau, a term first coined in 1997 by then Federal
130

President Roman Herzog, meaning “reform blockage,” takes hold.

With the

Alliance for Jobs, this was most certainly the case. However,although this work only
deals with one unsuccessful case, there are other failed cases worthy ofmention,
including the Alliance for Jobs of 1996 and the post-Hartz Riirup Commission on the
financing of social insurance systems.
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The failure of the Alliance for Jobs is, without doubt,the norm in the
incremental German policymaking system. This means that the Hartz Commission’s
success is certainly the exception to the rule. The controversial nature ofthe Hartz
Reforms demonstrate that, although effective economic reform usually falls victim
to the corporatist and incrementalist German policymaking process,certain very
specific circumstances can actually provide a situation where the German system
enables the passage ofsuch legislation.
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